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1 Introduction
The most dramatic episode of centralization undertaken by the U.S. federal government achieved a striking
decrease in corruption. The New Deal, by introducing federal oversight of welfare spending, eradicated the
patronage and political manipulation that had hitherto characterized relief programs managed at the state
and local level (Wallis 2000a, b; Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor 2006). International evidence highlights similar
instances of a positive impact of political centralization on government accountability. Centralized political
institutions in precolonial Africa reduced corruption and fostered the rule of law, causing a long-lasting
increase in the provision of public goods that endured into the postcolonial period (Gennaioli and Rainer
2007a,b). Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that China has grown faster than Russia thanks to the greater
strength of its central government compared to local politicians. While contemporary cross-country studies
of decentralization and perceived corruption have yielded conicting results (Treisman 2007; Fan, Lin, and
Treisman 2009), it is clear empirically that centralization can increase government e¢ ciency and political
accountability, at least under the appropriate conditions.
This phenomenon is di¢ cult to understand through the lens of traditional models of scal federalism.
Oatess (1972, 1999) classic theory does not consider the problem of imperfectly accountable politicians and
posits two technological rationales for centralization: economies of scale and benets from policy coordina-
tion. The subsequent literature in political economy has mostly emphasized the advantages of decentraliza-
tion (Lockwood 2006). In particular, decentralized government is held to be more accountable, thanks to
yardstick competition across local jurisdictions (Besley and Case 1995; Besley and Smart 2007).1
In this paper, on the other hand, we explain how centralization can in fact enhance accountability. Our
approach reects for electoral incentives the fundamental intuition of gains from trade between heterogeneous
agents. Voters in di¤erent regions are unequally capable of incentivizing self-interested politicians. If the
regions are united in a single national polity, the central politician is mainly held accountable by the most
capable voters. Hence, his incentives and performance are better than those of the average local politician.
We capture this idea through a model of political agency with imperfectly informed voters. Selsh
politicians are entrusted with allocating the government budget between public goods and wasteful private
rents. Career concerns induce the incumbent to provide a positive amount of public goods in order to
signal ability and win the votes of those citizens who observe public good provision. In equilibrium, we
show that politicians extract lower rents if voters are better informed, consistent with the evidence that
voter information improves accountability (Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Snyder and
Strömberg 2010; Ponzetto 2011). Electoral discipline has decreasing returns because the threat of being
ousted from o¢ ce is less costly when rent extraction is already low. National elections, therefore, provide
much better incentives and screening than local elections in the least informed regions, and not much worse
than in the most informed ones. Centralization then increases overall e¢ ciency by reducing aggregate
political rents.
Our model predicts the regional distribution of the e¢ ciency gains from centralization. The central
government sets a uniform national policy that entails an identical level of public good provision throughout
the country (Oates 1972; Alesina and Spolaore 1997). As a consequence, all regions whose residents have
below-average political information derive a strict welfare increase from a switch from decentralized to
centralized government. The net impact on better informed regions is instead ambiguous. The average
information exploited in electing their rulers falls when they join the less informed parts of the union in a
1Conversely, the central government could be less susceptible to capture by special interest groups. However, formal analysis
of this possibility has reached ambiguous conclusions (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2006).
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national election. This dilution tends to reduce accountability. On the other hand, if public goods spill over
across regions, we show that all voters are keener on the ability of a central than a local politician. This
keenness makes national elections more competitive, raising accountability. While the most informed regions
may gain or lose from centralization, our theory entails an unambiguous relative prediction. A regions
welfare gains from centralization are strictly decreasing in its residentsinformation.
We test this prediction of our model using panel data on air pollutant emissions across U.S. states. This
series enables us to study the e¤ects of one of the most prominent instances of centralization in U.S. history
since World War II (Greenstone 2004). With the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, the federal government
took direct responsibility for air pollution regulation, which until that point had rested primarily with states
and local governments. We perform a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis to assess whether the federal takeover
of environmental policy had a di¤erential impact on states according to their level of information.
The empirical evidence supports our theoretical prediction. The introduction of federal standards is
associated with a highly signicant di¤erential trend. After 1970, pollutant emissions begin to decline
markedly in less informed states relative to more informed ones. The nding obtains for di¤erent recorded
emissions, and it is robust to specications that control for simultaneous di¤erences-in-di¤erences based on
other potential determinants of pollution, such as income per capita or the size of the manufacturing sector.
In line with our theory, the di¤erential reduction in emissions seems to represent a benet of centralization
for the less informed, since we do not observe a simultaneous di¤erential reduction in economic activity.
Both theoretically and empirically, we nd that centralization entails systematic distributional conse-
quences that favor regions with less informed voters, whose local government is more dysfunctional. This
pattern contrasts with Strömbergs (2004) nding that discretionary New Deal spending was disproportion-
ately allocated to more informed counties within a state. We conclude by showing that a natural extension
of our theoretical framework encompasses and interprets the two opposite phenomena. Under centralization,
uniformly provided public goods such as national emission standards benet the less informed; conversely,
discretionary funds are targeted to the more informed. Our theory highlights the importance of striking a
balance between the two. Without any uniformity, centralization would be welfare reducing despite the asso-
ciated reduction in political rents. When instead uniform and discretionary items are in the right proportions,
centralization is not only welfare increasing but also Pareto e¢ cient.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Public Good Provision and Political Agency
The economy is populated by innitely lived agents, whose preferences are separable over time and quasilinear
across a set of public goods p = 1; :::; P . Individual i in period t derives utility
uit = ~u
i
t +
PX
p=1
ip log gp;t, (1)
where ~uit is utility from private consumption, and gp;t the provision of public good p. The relative importance
of each good for individual i is described by the shares ip  0 such that
PP
p=1 
i
p = 1. We focus on public-
good provision, treating ~uit as an exogenous shock.
Public goods are provided by a politician who allocates a given government budget b, invariant over time
and subject to a balanced-budget constraint every period. Expenditure on each public good p is xp;t, and
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residually the politician can extract an unproductive private rent rt  0. Thus
rt +
PX
p=1
xp;t = b. (2)
The politicians objective is to maximize rent extraction over his term in o¢ ce. His discount factor is
 2 (0; 1].
For a given level of spending, public goods are produced with technology
gp;t = e
p;txp;t. (3)
Productivity p;t represents the stochastic competence of the politician in providing good p. It is independent
across public goods, and follows a rst-order moving average process
p;t = "p;t + "p;t 1. (4)
The shocks "p;t are independent and identically distributed across policies, over time, and across politicians.
They have support ["; "^], mean zero and variance 2.
Within each period t, events unfold according to the following timeline.
1. The incumbent politicians past competence shock "t 1 becomes common knowledge.
2. The incumbent chooses expenditures xt, and residually rent rt, without knowing the realization of his
period-t competence shock "t.
3. "t is realized and the provision of public goods gt is determined.
4. Each voter i observes the provision gp;t of public good p with probability i; with probability 1  i he
remains completely uninformed about gp;t.2 The arrival of information is independent across voters.
No voter can have any direct observation of "t, rt, or xp;t for any p.
5. An election is held, pitting the incumbent against a single challenger, randomly drawn from the same
pool of potential o¢ ce-holders.
The electorate consists of a continuum of atomistic voters. It can be partitioned into J internally
homogeneous groups. Group j comprises a fraction j of voters, who have identical preferences jp, and
identical probabilities j of information acquisition.
Each voters political preferences consist of two independent elements, following the probabilistic-voting
approach (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). First, agents have preferences Euit+1 over the provision of public
goods they expect from either politician in the following period. Given information 
it, individual i has
policy preferences
i
 

it
  E" PX
p=1
ip
 
log gIp;t+1   log gCp;t+1
 j
it
#
, (5)
where gIp;t+1 denotes public-good provision if the incumbent is re-elected, and g
C
p;t+1 if the challenger defeats
him. In addition, voters have preferences for candidatesnon-policy characteristics, such as their likability
2This is not inconsistent with knowledge of ones own utility uit. The exogenous component ~u
i
t may include a stochastic
shock, and uninformed voters are unable to distinguish between the e¤ects of the shock and those of gp;t.
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or the ideology of their party. Thus voter i votes for the incumbent if and only if
i
 

it
  	t +  it, (6)
where 	t and  
i
t are independent draws from common-knowledge probability distributions. The common
shock 	t to the incumbents popularity accounts for the aggregate uncertainty in the electoral outcome.
The idiosyncratic shock  it to each voters tastes provides the intensive margin of political support, and is
i.i.d. across agents. Both variables have uniform distributions with supports respectively [ 1= (2) ; 1= (2)]
and
  ;  , su¢ ciently wide that neither any voters ballot nor the outcomes of the election are perfectly
predictable on the basis of policy considerations alone.
Assumption 1 The support of the electoral shocks 	t and  it is su¢ ciently wide, and that of the competence
shocks "p;t su¢ ciently narrow, that
1
2
    " < "^     1
2
and   1
2
 " < "^  1
2
,
where
 =
XJ
j=1
jj.
2.2 Voter Information and Government Accountability
The incumbents and the challengers competence shocks are known to be independent draws from a common
distribution. Moreover, voters have rational expectations that any politician in every period will choose the
same allocation x, because the environment is stationary and performance is separable in e¤ort and ability.
Voter is information is described by the set 
it of public goods p whose provision gp;t he has observed. These
observations allow him to infer the incumbents competence p;t, whereas he has no information about the
challenger. His policy preferences are
i
 

it

=
X
p2
it
ipE ("p;tjgp;t) =
X
p2
it
ip (log gp;t   log xp   "p;t 1) . (7)
Each group j comprises a continuum of agents and the arrival of information is independent across agents,
so a share j of its member have observed public-good provision gp;t, while the remainder 1   j have not.
Given the independent realizations of the uniform idiosyncratic shock  i, the share of members of group j
who vote for the incumbent is
vjt =
1
2
+
1
2 
"
j
PX
p=1
jp (log gp;t   log xp   "p;t 1) 	t
#
, (8)
conditional on the realizations of gt and 	t. Taking into account the uniform aggregate shock 	t, the
incumbents probability of re-election is
 (xt) =
1
2
+ 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jp (log xp;t   log xp) (9)
as a function of his policy choices xt (and residually rt).
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The politician understands that if he is re-elected he will have further occasions to extract rents. Denote
by R their expected present value. The trade-o¤ between current and future rent extraction leads to policy
choices
x = arg max
xt
(
b 
PX
p=1
xp;t +R (xt)
)
, (10)
namely
xp = R
JX
j=1
jj
j
p for all p = 1; :::; P , (11)
and thus current rent extraction
r = b  R. (12)
In equilibrium, the probability of re-election is 1=2, because the politician does not have private informa-
tion at the time of the policy choice, voters have rational expectations, and their non-policy tastes do not
have a permanent bias against incumbency nor in its favor. As a consequence, the present value of re-election
is
R = 
1X
t=0


2
t
r =
2
2   r. (13)
Substituting this relationship into equations 11 and 12, solving the latter, and plugging it into the former,
we obtain the equilibrium allocation of the government budget. To economize on notation, we dene
~  
2   2 (0; 1] , (14)
a convenient rescaling of the politicians discount factor.
Finally, rational expectations imply that the incumbent is re-elected if and only if
	t 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jp"p;t. (15)
Let t be an indicator variable for this condition. The competence of ruling politicians evolves according to
^t = t 1
 
"It 1 + "
I
t

+
 
1  t 1
  
"Ct 1 + "
C
t

, (16)
where the superscripts I and C refer to the incumbent and challenger in the election at the end of period
t  1. The unconditional expectation of ability is then
E^p;t = E
 
t 1"p;t 1

. (17)
This completes the characterization of the stationary equilibrium of our model of political career concerns.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, a politician with budget b extracts rent r = b, with rent extraction
 

1 + 2~
 1
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He sets expenditure on the provision of public good p to xp = p (1  ) b, with relative shares
p 
JX
j=1
j
j

jp.
His expected ability at providing public good p is
E^p = 2
XJ
j=1
jj
j
p.
An increase in 
PJ
j=1 jj
j
p induces an increase in ^p in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
Equilibrium rents are proportional to the government budget b. Rent extraction declines as voters
are more informed (@=@ < 0), since information allows them to monitor the politician more tightly.
This result accords with the empirical nding that government performance improves with media scrutiny
(Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Snyder and Strömberg 2010; Ponzetto 2011), as well
as with votershuman capital (Glaeser and Saks 2006) and social capital (Nannicini et al. 2010), which
facilitate respectively the acquisition and the sharing of information. Rents are also reduced when voters
are more likely to be swayed by policy than non-policy considerations (@=@ < 0). Finally, rent extraction
declines when politicians are more patient (@=@ < 0), because they are more willing to sacrice current
benets for a higher probability of remaining in o¢ ce in the future.
Intuitively, it is impossible for rents to fall to zero, since the politicians incentive to refrain from appro-
priating the entire current budget is entirely due to his desire to gain reelection and keep pocketing future
rents. More broadly, reductions in rent extraction through electoral discipline become progressively more
di¢ cult as the equilibrium rent declines. All rent-decreasing factors, namely information , competitiveness
, and patience , have positive but decreasing returns (@2=@
2
> 0, @2=@2 > 0, @2=@2 > 0).
The same factors that make elections a better incentive device also make them a better screening mech-
anism. The average productivity of government spending is proportional to the variance of the underlying
distribution of ability (2), which measures the gains available from screening. The e¤ectiveness of screening
rises when voters are more informed about public-good provision (@E^p=@j > 0), and thus have the ability
to cast their ballots on the basis of a signal of the incumbents skill. Moreover, screening is more e¤ective
when citizens are more willing to vote on the basis of observed performance, rather than out of idiosyncratic
non-policy tastes (@E^p=@ > 0). These e¤ects raise not only the expectation of ability, but its entire
distribution, in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
Through improvements in both political incentives and political selection, higher voter information ()
increases the equilibrium welfare of each voter, which is given by
Euj =
PX
p=1
jpE log gp;t = log b+ log (1  ) +
PX
p=1
jp
 
E^p + log p

(18)
for each member of group j. Welfare also rises with voterskeenness on policy outcomes (), politicians
patience (), and the variance of their ability distribution (2).
The allocation of spending across public goods () reects both di¤erences in preferences and di¤erences
in information. A utilitarian social welfare planner would set budget shares
p = p 
XJ
j=1
j
j
p, (19)
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reecting average preferences for each public good. However, the politician is only imperfectly accountable,
and specically he is only held accountable by informed voters. Thus his choices deviate from social welfare
optimization even beyond the extraction of a rent. The allocation of expenditure across public goods obey a
weighted social welfare function in which each groups preferences are is weighted by its level of information
j .
2.3 E¢ cient Centralization
The economy is divided into L regions, each inhabited by a measure-one population of homogeneous residents.
There are then LP public goods: their indexing is expanded so that gl;p;t is the provision of public good p
in location l at time t. Politicians are drawn independently across regions, from identical local pools.
In keeping with the classic theory of scal federalism (Oates 1972), we admit the possibility of externalities
in public-good provision. These externalities are measured by an index lp 2 [0; 1]. A resident of region l
derives utility
ll;p =

1  L  1
L
lp

lp > 0 (20)
from public goods provided to his own region, but he may also derives additional utility
lm;p =
1
L
p
l
p for l 6= m (21)
from public goods provided in any other region. Thus we can write individual utility
uit = ~u
i
t +
PX
p=1
" 
1  ip

ip log gl;p;t +
1
L
ip
LX
m=1
ip log gm;p;t
#
. (22)
With decentralized government, in each region a local politician with ability l;p;t independently allocates
the regional budget bDl to expenditures on local public goods x
D
l;p;t, and residually extracts a rent in proportion
Dl .
Centralization means that a single politician with ability p;t allocates the national budget b
C to ex-
penditures on public goods xCp;t, and residually extracts a rent in proportion 
C
l . Each region then receives
public goods
gCl;p;t =
1
L
ep;txCp;t. (23)
This formulation implies that there are no economies of scale in public-good provision, which removes
the most obvious force pushing for centralization. It also means that centralization imposes a constraint of
policy uniformity: gCl;p;t = g
C
p;t for all regions l. This constraint has been highlighted, since Oates (1972), as
another simple rationale for decentralization (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro
2005). Its presence allows a direct comparison between our results and Oatess Decentralization Theorem.
The exogenous government budget is identical under centralization and decentralization, and homoge-
neous across regions. Every region l has a local government budget bD under decentralization, or under
centralization it contributes bD to the central government budget bC = LbD. Di¤erences in tax revenues
resulting from heterogeneous income across regions would provide an immediate welfare benet of central-
ization, since a utilitarian welfare function favors the egalitarian distribution of resources across regions that
is implied by the uniformity constraint.
The following proposition establishes the benecial e¤ect of centralization on political accountability.
8
Proposition 2 Aggregate rent extraction is lower under centralization (C  PLl=1 Dl =L) . It is strictly
lower if information is heterogeneous across regions (l 6= m for some regions l 6= m), or if there are
externalities in public-good provision (lp > 0 for some l and p).
Average e¢ ciency in providing each public good is higher under centralization (E^Cp 
PL
l=1 E^
D
l;p=L). It
is strictly higher if there are externalities in public-good provision (lp > 0 for some l and p).
The rst and key result in the proposition is that if voters are heterogeneously informed (l 6= m
for l 6= m), and thus politicians are heterogeneously accountable, centralization has benecial aggregate
e¤ects on accountability. The decline in rent extraction is an intuitive consequence of decreasing returns
to monitoring. By joining heterogeneous regions into a single polity, centralization leads to an overall level
of political information equal to the average  of information across regions. For regions with low voter
information, this represents a large improvement, because the increase in accountability is powerful given
the low starting point of their political accountability under decentralization. For regions with high voter
information, the deterioration is not equally stark, because the marginal value of information is low when
it is plentiful to begin with. The aggregate e¤ect of centralization is thus an unambiguous decrease in rent
extraction.
Centralization also increases political accountability if there are spillovers in public goods across regions
(lp > 0). Advantages of centralization in the presence of inter-regional externalities are present in all
theories of federalism since Oates (1972). But the classic theory only considers the benets of coordination,
abstracting from any political-economy considerations. Proposition 2 nds that spillovers improve incentives
even if there is no need to coordinate budget allocations because preferences are identical across regions.
Political accountability improves due to the intensive margin of electoral support.
In the election, each citizen is more likely to support the incumbent if he has proved to be more capable
than average. The intensity of popular support, however, depends not only on the extent of ability, but also
on its importance. A voter who is informed of the incumbents poor skills may nonetheless vote for him
because of his personal likability or ideological a¢ nity. He is, however, less likely to do so as the economic
stakes in the election rise. If there are public good spillovers, the stakes are indeed higher in a national than
in a local election. For  > 0, every voter is keener on electing a procient politician at the central rather
than at the regional level, because his ability will a¤ect public goods in all regions, and each voter cares
about them all. Thus centralization reduces the inuence of non-policy preferences on electoral outcomes,
improving the monitoring value of elections.
Through the same channel, the screening value of elections also increases. Since voters are more concerned
about the ability of a national than a local politician, in equilibrium they select a central government whose
average ability (E^p) is greater. Thanks to centralization, not only wasteful rents decline, but the e¢ ciency
of productive public spending simultaneously rises.
As in Oates (1972), decentralization can be benecial to avoid the cost of policy uniformity when regions
have heterogeneous preferences. However, Proposition 2 establishes new forces that tend to make central-
ization more e¢ cient than decentralization. Thus, the Decentralization Theorem holds in our model only
if voters are homogeneously informed (l =  for all l). With heterogeneous information, centralization is
systematically welfare increasing.
Proposition 3 Suppose that information is homogeneous (l =  for all l).
1. If there are no externalities and preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = 0 for all l and p),
then centralization and decentralization yield identical outcomes.
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2. If there are externalities and preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l, with 
l
p > 0
for some p), then centralization yields higher welfare than decentralization.
3. If there are no externalities and preferences are heterogeneous (lp = 0 for all l and p while 
l
p 6= mp
for some l 6= m and p), then decentralization yields higher welfare than centralization.
Suppose that information is heterogeneous (l 6= m for some l 6= m). If preferences are homogeneous
(lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l), centralization yields higher welfare than decentralization.
The rst three points coincide with Oatess Decentralization Theorem. When there are neither het-
erogeneity nor spillovers in information, these classic results obtain in spite of the distortions arising from
imperfect political agency.
Without externalities, there are no benets from policy coordination. With homogeneous preferences,
there are no costs of policy uniformity. Furthermore, in this case imperfect agency causes the same distortions
under centralization or decentralization. Constituency size a¤ects political agency through two opposing
forces (Seabright 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000). Centralization reduces the probability that voters in any
one region are pivotal in the election. Hence a central politician is less responsive to each voters preferences
than a local politician is to those of his fewer constituents. Conversely, centralization increases the scale of
political rents. When the politician allocates the larger central budget instead of a smaller regional budget,
re-election is more valuable. A greater value of re-election sharpens the incentives for the central politician
to perform well. Proposition 3 shows that these forces are perfectly balanced. Centralization expands the
budget by a factor L, while reducing the electoral clout of each region by a factor 1=L. The politicians
incentives are thus invariant with respect to the scale of his constituency. Rent extraction is proportional to
the government budget, as established in Proposition 1.
The second point of the Decentralization Theorem deals with the benets of policy coordination. Oates
(1972) assumed that local politicians maximize local welfare but cannot cooperate. In our model, even if
local politicians could cooperate across regions, they would have no incentives to do so. Local politicians are
uninterested in changing each others behavior. Their only goal is to signal their own ability to their own
constituents, which they do most e¤ectively by ignoring all externalities. Thus, Proposition 3 reects an
endogenous inability to internalize externalities under decentralization. In addition, Proposition 2 showed
that the incentives and screening both improve under centralization when there are externalities in public
good provision.
Finally, the third point highlights the standard cost of a binding uniformity constraint. Centralization
is costly when regions have heterogeneous preferences, because it involves a suboptimal allocation of ex-
penditure across regions. Furthermore, with imperfect political agency a binding uniformity constraint also
worsens electoral screening. Politicians skill sets are more congruent with their constituentspreferences
when they are elected locally rather than in a single national election.
Proposition 3 concludes by showing that voter information generically modies the ndings of the De-
centralization Theorem in favor of centralization. With homogeneous preferences, decentralization is strictly
dominated not only when there are externalities, but also when information is heterogeneous across regions.
Then it is no longer unambiguously true that decentralization is benecial when preferences are heteroge-
neous: the costs of policy uniformity can be more than o¤set by the accountability benets described by
Proposition 2.
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2.4 The Distribution of E¢ ciency Gains
Proposition 2 highlighted the mechanisms through which centralization increases average political account-
ability and therefore aggregate e¢ ciency. Accordingly, Proposition 3 established that centralization is
welfare-increasing from the national perspective when preferences are homogeneous. The benets of central-
ization, however, are unevenly distributed across regions. The aggregate improvement in political account-
ability established by 2 is also a transfer from the more to the less informed.
Proposition 4 Suppose that preferences are homogeneous and information heterogeneous across regions
(lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l and p; l 6= m for some l 6= m). If residents of region l are less informed
than residents of region m, then centralization yields a greater increase in the expected provision of all public
goods and thus in welfare in region l than in region m (l < m implies E

gCl;p   gDl;p

> E
 
gCm;p   gDm;p

for
all p and E
 
uCl   uDl

> E
 
uCm   uDm

).
If furthermore there are no externalities in public good provision (p = 0 for all p) then region l is
better o¤ under centralization than decentralization if and only if its voters are less informed than average
(l   , EuCl  EuDl ).
When voter information is heterogeneous, centralization reduces rent extraction by transferring political
monitoring from the regions whose voters are more informed than average to those with less than average
information. The more informed regions are better at incentivizing and selecting local politicians. Conversely,
the less informed regions are plagued with rent-extracting and incompetent local governments. Centralization
e¤ectively enables them to outsource their governance to better informed voters in other regions.
The overall impact of centralization on better informed regions is ambiguous. On the one hand, the
quality of their electoral process is diluted when the constituency is expanded to include regions with less
informed voters. On the other hand, in the presence of externalities (p > 0) all voters are more likely to
act on the basis of whatever information they have in a national election. While the dilution of informed
voters blunts the monitoring and screening ability of the electorate, externalities from central policy decisions
sharpen it. The net e¤ect is negative in the absence of spillovers, but it can be positive when they are present.
Conversely, regions with below-average information always gains from centralization. The implicit trans-
fer of accountability e¤ected by centralization e¤ectively entails a welfare-increasing transfer of public funds,
although every region contributes an equal amount (b) to of the government budget and receives an identical
provision of public goods (g). In fact, the transfer is precisely a consequence of this two-sided uniformity.
Under decentralization, the contributions (b) are also identical, but less informed regions su¤er much higher
rent extraction and enjoy considerably lower productive government spending.
In the United States, the data conrm that political corruption varies greatly across states (Glaeser and
Saks 2006). In Oregon, less than one public o¢ cial per million inhabitants was convicted of corruption-
related crimes in an average year from 1976 to 2002. In the same period, the corruption rate was above 5
in Alaska, Mississippi, and Louisiana.3 Proposition 4 then implies that expansion of the federal government
should benet disproportionally the states with lower political accountability, and more precisely lower voter
information. The next section tests this prediction with evidence from federal environmental policy.
Suggestive empirical support for our theoretical prediction is also provided by European evidence. The
European Union encompasses large disparities in the quality of government across regions and member states
(Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2011). Consistent with our model, Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) con-
clude that an EU directive introducing uniform standards for packaging waste was less stringent than the
3The average is 2.8 per million and the standard deviation 1.3.
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existing German, Danish and Dutch laws, but was signicantly stricter than the Greek, Irish and Portuguese
requirements. Italy provides a striking example of large regional disparities in information and account-
ability (Putnam 1993; Del Monte and Papagni 2001, 2007; Golden and Picci 2005). Durante, Labartino,
and Perottis (2011) empirical ndings on decentralization in the Italian public university system correspond
perfectly to our theory. A 1998 reform transferred responsibility for faculty hiring from the national level to
the individual universities. As a result, the quality of academic recruitment fell in provinces with lower news-
paper readership. Those with higher readership experienced no decline but at most a marginal improvement,
implying an aggregate e¢ ciency loss from decentralization.
3 Evidence from the Clean Air Act
To test the fundamental empirical prediction of our model we focus on a clear discontinuity in U.S. environ-
mental policy. Up to the 1960s, air pollution had been primarily regulated at the state and local government.
The year 1970 marked a dramatic centralizing intervention by the federal government. Federal involvement
rested on two pillars: the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the passage of
the Clean Air Act of 1970 and subsequent amendments, which phased in national air quality standards for
a set of criterion polluters. National standardization stood in sharp contrast with the previous state-based
regulations, which had been adopted only by a few states, imposing very heterogenous standards (U.S. Sen-
ate, 1970). We use the Clean Air Act, and the sharp regulatory shift it entailed, to test the distributional
predictions of our model, set out in Proposition 4.
The core of our analysis considers sulfur dioxide emissions. Sulfur dioxide is a very signicant and poten-
tially harmful polluter. In the United States in 1970, among anthropogenic sources, SO2 was predominantly
released by electric utilities, which accounted for almost 56% of the total emission (90% of which from coal-
fueled power plants, and 10% from oil-fueled ones), followed by metals processing (15%) and industrial fuel
combustion (14%), released in a variety of industrial processes involving the combustion of high-sulfur fuels.
Besides contributing to acid rain along with nitrous oxides, SO2 at relatively high levels entails signicantly
adverse health e¤ects, as it harms pulmonary and cardiovascular functions, and, in extreme cases, may lead
to premature death. Furthermore, even at much lower levels, it severely damages crops.4
Sulfur dioxide was targeted in 1971, immediately after the passage of the Clean Air Act. After the
standards were imposed, sulfur dioxide emissions declined drastically. However, the existence of a causal
link between the legislation and the downward trend in emissions is still debated (Greenstone 2004). We do
not mean to contribute to this debate by estimating the aggregate e¤ect of the policy shift. Our empirical
investigation is restricted to the study of the di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act across states. In
particular, we investigate the e¤ect of citizensinformation on the di¤erential trends in emission mitigation
across states before and after the 1970 reform.
3.1 Data and Empirical Specication
Our main outcome variable is sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions for the 48 continental U.S. states; we also
consider nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions as a robustness check. We use the same data as in Bulte, List,
Strazicich (2007). They are part of a series covering the period 1929-1999 of state-level sulfur dioxides and
4Sulfur dioxide emissions have been extensively studied, both with reference to the United States (List and Gallet 1999;
List and Gerking 2000; Greenstone 2004; List and Sturm 2006; Bulte, List, and Strazicich 2007), and in cross-country analyses
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995).
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nitrogen oxides emissions in short tons per capita. Bulte, List and Strazicich drew them from National Air
Pollutant Emission Trends (U.S. EPA, 1994).
We measure citizensinformation with newspapers circulation per capita. We constructed the panel data
from annual editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, which in turn reports data from the
Editor & Publisher International Yearbook. The gure is available for all states annually, with the exception
of 1974. In addition to availability, newspaper circulation is a particularly apt measure of votersability to
acquire information about government policy. Up to the 1980s, newspapers were Americansmain source
of political news. Moreover, newspaper reader are acknowledged to be better informed and more involved
in politics than consumers of other media (Graber 1984; Putnam 1993, 2000; Gentzkow 2006; Gentzkow,
Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011).
Our control variables include population, GDP, and value added from the manufacturing sector by state.
All of these are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Accounts.5 The state GDP series is only
available since 1963, dictating the starting point of our sample.We consider data up to 1980, covering the
rst decade since the enactment of Clean Air Act as well as most of the prior decade, to estimate the changes
in patterns induced by the reform.
Our basic analysis is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate of the e¤ect of information on the reduction in
emissions follosing the imposition of national air quality standards. Our outcome measure for the pollutants
concentration is the emission intensity of state GDP, and our main regression specication is the following:
(SO2)i;t
GDPi;t
= + Ii  Pt + Ii  St +X 0i;t  Pt +X 0i;t St + t + i + i  t+ i;t. (24)
We include year xed e¤ect t, state xed e¤ects i, and a state-specic linear time trend i  t.
The main regressor of interest is information Ii. We dene information at the state level, choosing 1970
as the reference year. As a robustness test, we also consider the time average over the entire sample period.
We use two di¤erent but related measures of information. One is simply newspaper circulation per capita.
The second is a binary variable, which equals 1 for states whose circulation is larger than the mean across
states, and 0 for those below the mean.
To study the di¤erential trend in emissions after the Clean Air Act, we consider two interactions of Ii.
First, with a dummy Pt, which takes up the value 1 if t > 1970 and 0 otherwise. This would capture a level
break in the series upon the introduction of federal emission standards. Second, with a linear time trend St,
equal to t   1970 for t > 1970 and 0 otherwise. This would capture a break in the trend of emissions after
the reform.
Such a gradual impact is to be expected because the regulatory transition was itself gradual and required
several years. States retained a role in the implementation and in the enforcement of the national standards,
and were allowed until 1975 to comply (U.S. EPA, 1995). Additional evidence of gradualism is provided by
the number of operating monitors reading the concentration of air pollutants, a key factor in the enforcement
process, which increased gradually throughout the 1970s (Greenstone, 2004).
We introduce controls X by treating them exactly like our main independent variable. We begin by
allowing a di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act on the basis not of information but by income. Thus, we
introduce GDP per capita as a control. As with newspaper circulation, we consider the GDP of the state in
1970, or a binary variable that equals 1 if state GDP is above the average across states. This measure is then
interacted with Pt and St, while the baseline is absorbed by the state xed e¤ect. In our full set of control,
5We compute population density using state land area from the 2000 U.S. Census.
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we also introduce in the same manner manufacturing value added per capita and population density.
3.2 Results
Before turning to our regression analysis, we can starkly visualize the main result in Figure 1. The graph
plots average sulfur emissions for two group of states: those with above-average newspaper circulation in
1970, and those with below-average newspaper circulation. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences emerges clearly:
uninformed states have considerably higher average emissions before 1970, and start decreasing them faster
than the informed states as soon as national emission standards are introduced by the federal government.
The convergence is gradual, with a trend instead of level break, but dramatic.
Table 1 conrms this result in our full regression specication including all controls. Columns (1), (3),
and (5) report the results when Ii is measured as a binary variable, as in Figure 1; while in columns (2), (4),
and (6) Ii is measured as a continuous variable.
The coe¢ cient on newspapers circulation per capita is statistically signicant with the expected sign for
the trend e¤ect throughout the six specications. Indeed, the time trend appears to be the most obvious t
to our natural experiment. As previously discussed, the history of the Clean Air Act suggests that air quality
standards were phased in gradually. The binary information measure, in any case, displays a signicant level
break in addition to its signicant trend break.
The inclusion of controls does not qualitatively a¤ect the results. In fact, the estimated coe¢ cients and
standard errors show very small quantitative changes, strengthening the signicance of the empirical support
for the theoretically predicted role of information.
As a robustness test, as anticipated, we repeat the same analysis with a slightly di¤erent measure of
information. The continuous information variable is now, for each state, the average value of circulation in
the 1963-1980 period. The binary variable takes the value 1 if the average value of circulation for the state
in the 1963-1980 period exceeds the mean of the average values for all the states in the same period. Figure
2 and Table 2 show the results. As in Table 1, the trend e¤ect for newspaper circulation is signicant in all
six specication, and the coe¢ cients are only slightly reduced by the inclusion of control variables.
GDP is signicant, although now as a trend e¤ect and only under the binary measure of information; its
sign is opposite with respect to the baseline specication. Combining the twelve specications, we observe
a robust e¤ect of the information variable (in trends), as opposed to a weaker and less persistent e¤ect of
GDP. Notwithstanding concerns of correlation between newspaper circulation and GDP, the inclusion of the
GDP in the estimation a¤ects only marginally our estimator of the di¤erential e¤ect of information.
Overall, the results provide a clear empirical support for the notion, predicted by our theory, that
the Clean Air Act had a di¤erential impact across states, and that the di¤erence depends on the level of
information. Our results highlight that centralization improved the quality of air in states less informed than
the average.
An extensive literature has assessed the benets accruing to the population as a result of the CAA-
induced emissions mitigation. Chay and Greenstone (2005) estimate the e¤ect of the improvement in the
quality of air on housing prices. By using data on total suspended particulate (TSP) air pollution, they
nd that better quality of air causes a substantial increase in house prices. Their welfare calculation shows
that the mid-1970s TSPs regulation provided a $45 billion aggregate increase in house values.6 Chay and
6As their measure of regulation, they use EPAs split of counties into attainment and non-attainment. While the actual
criteria used by EPA for the non-attainment designation are not entirely clear (Greenstone, 2004), counties whose emissions
exceed the national standards are more likely to be classied as non-attaining. In the context of the CAAAs, the non-attainment
designation triggers a stricter regulation.
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Greenstone (2003) analyze the relation between air pollution and infant mortality, and nd a signicant
positive association. They estimate that a reduction in TSPs by 1 g=m3 is associated to approximately 200
additional infants surviving to one year of age.
As a further check of the robustness of our results, we repeat the entire analysis using a time series of
emissions for nitrogen oxides NOx. Sources of nitrogen oxides di¤er remarkably from those of sulfur dioxide.
While the latter is released almost exclusively by stationary sources (in 1970, the transportation sector
accounted for less than 2% of total emissions), the single main source for the nitrogen oxides is represented
by on-road vehicles, which accounted for 35% of total emissions in the United States in 1970, as compared
to 23% for electric utilities and 20% for industrial fuel combustion. The adverse health e¤ects of nitrogen
oxides primarily involve respiratory and cardiovascular problems, similarly to sulfur dioxides.
National air quality standards for NO2 were imposed in 1971. However, specic standard for NOx
expressly targeting automobile emissions (consisting in national vehicle emission limits on NOx emissions)
were phased in starting in 1973 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2000), and applied to an increasingly
large portion of the United States vehicle eet over the years, as old cars were scrapped and replaced by
new ones. 7 Changes in the nitrogen oxides emissions materialized, after 1970, in an even more gradual way
than for sulfur dioxide. There are, therefore, reasons to expect a trend e¤ect to be visible after 1970 rather
than a level e¤ect.
Figures 3 and 4 show the trend in NOx emissions intensity of GDP after splitting the states into two
groups according to whether their newspaper circulation was above or below average in 1970. The gures
suggest that a discontinuity, in this case, might be associated with the 1972 vehicle emission limits rather
than with the Clean Air Act itself. Despite this potential concern, Tables 3 and 4 yield results that are
remarkably similar to those in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, replacing the sulfur dioxide series with the one for
nitrogen oxides. The coe¢ cients on the newspaper circulation trend interactions are statistically signicant
at the 1% level for all 12 specications. Again, GDP has a less clear e¤ect.
3.3 Discussion
A legitimate concern with environmental regulation is that clean air may come at the cost of a deterioration in
local economic conditions, as plants choose to relocate away from tightly regulated areas. Previous research
has shown that air quality regulation indeed a¤ects industrial location and is associated with reductions in
employment, investment and shipments at the local level (Henderson 1996; Becker and Henderson 2002). In
addition, tight standards determine a signicant reduction in total factor productivity for polluting plants
(Greenstone, List and Syverson, 2011). We might then suspect that the di¤erential emission reduction
following the Clean Air Act could be mirrored by a simultaneous di¤erential negative impact on economic
activity in the uninformed states, which recorded the largest emission reductions.
However, our analysis nds no evidence of such a di¤erential e¤ect. Figure 5 shows the series of GDP
per capita for the two groups of states, more and less informed than the average across states in 1970.
Unlike emissions, GDP per capita does not display any clear pattern of di¤erences-in-di¤erences between
informed and uninformed states before and after 1970. A very similar argument can be made for the share of
manufacturing in state GDP. Figure 6 shows its evolution for the two groups of states. Federal intervention in
environmental regulation does not seem to be associated with any di¤erential impact on the manufacturing
share by information.
7Standards started to be applied to cars produced in the 1973 model year.
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The pattern of the data then suggest that the di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act can plausibly
be interpreted according to our theoretical model. Before 1970, under state and local governments rule,
uninformed states were facing a problem of bad regulation. They were subject to excessively loose standards
(or no standards whatsoever), to the point that, when the federal government stepped in and prescribed
tighter regulatory requirements, it was able to do so at a very limited (and possibly nil) di¤erential cost for
the states involved. Federal standards may have been costly for the entire nation, but they do not appear
to have been costlier for the uninformed states that reaped the greatest declines in emissions.
Suggestive evidence of a problem of bad regulation by the uninformed states can also be gleaned from
direct measures of local government activity. We can look at two di¤erent measures of regulatory inputs:
expenditures by state and local governments for air quality control, and actual regulations implemented by
states and local governments before 1970.
Consistent with the public good nature of air pollution, Henderson (1996) nds that a larger expenditure
in the state on abatement activities is associated with better outcomes in terms of air quality.8 We obtain
direct state expenditure from the U.S. Department of Commerce yearly report: Environmental Quality
Control (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1971, 1980). The report publishes the yearly expenditure for air
quality control for states, counties, and cities. Since the rst published report is for the scal year 1969,
this source allows us to compare a period before the 1970 Clean Air Act to one after: we consider a decade
and compare with data for the scal year 1978. By combining state, county and city data, we construct a
measure total expenditure for air quality control regulation for each year and state. Splitting the sample
into two groups of states, based on average newspaper circulation in 1970, we nd that in 1969 spending
relative to GDP in uninformed states was on average 71% as much as in informed states. In 1978, spending in
uninformed states rose to 86% of spending in informed states. After the introduction of uniform standards,
uninformed states closed half the gap with informed states.9 The 1970 policy shift may have fostered a
convergence, in percentage terms, of state and local government expenditures in air pollution regulation. In
line with our theoretical model and with our main empirical result, this suggests a di¤erential e¤ect of the
reform on the expenditure levels, based on the level of citizensinformation.
As a second measure of regulatory input, we use the total number of standards implemented at the
state level before 1970. Our source are the hearings of the subcommittee on air and water pollution of
the United States senate (U.S. Senate, 1970). The document reports the standards adopted by states and
local governments before 1970 on ten pollutants.10 We count the number of pollutants that each state had
regulated prior to 1970, and we then divide the states into two groups according to the usual criterion based
on newspaper circulation in 1970. We nd that informed states had, on average, adopted four standards,
while uninformed states had, on average, adopted three standards only.
The document also reports the number of states that had proposed or adopted emission standards for
sulfur dioxide and for total suspended particulate as a result of the provision of the 1967 Air Quality Act.11
We again divide the states into informed and uninformed based on the average level of newspaper circulation
8He uses the Pollution Abatement Control Expenditures (PACE) series, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census. The series collects state-level data on rms expenditures on abatement activity. It is available starting in 1973.
9The raw correlation between information (measured as a binary variable) and expenditure/GDP declined from .26 (and
10% signicance level) in 1969 to 0.10 (and non signicant, with a p-value of .4963) in 1978.
10The ten pollutants are carbon monoxides, beryllium, uorides, hydrogen sulde, lead, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxides,
sulfuric acid, suspended particulates and total oxidants.
11The 1967 Air Quality Act required that states establish air quality control regions and that the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare promulgate criteria to serve as the basis for setting emission standards. States would then use the
HEW information to set air quality standards. Under the Air Quality Act, states retained autonomy in their decision of setting
the criteria.
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in 1970, and nd that 50% of the informed states had proposed or adopted emission standards for the two
pollutants, as opposed to only 25% among the uninformed. This suggests that more informed states had
more standards before the federal intervention. The uniform national standards imposed after the Clean Air
Act would ipso facto trigger a regulatory convergence, entailing a greater improvement in the standards of
the less informed and less regulated states.
4 Centralization without Uniformity
Section 2 presented a model of political and scal centralization in which public goods are uniformly pro-
vided across regions by the central government, and di¤erentiation only occurs under decentralized local
governments. The assumption of a uniform national policy is natural vis à vis the empirical analysis of
Section 3, since the very purpose of the 1970 Clean Air Act was to introduce uniform national standards for
regulating pollution and its abatement. Moreover, the uniformity assumption has been standard in the lit-
erature on scal federalism since Oates (1972). Nonetheless, imposing a uniformity constraint on centralized
public-good provision is not necessarily realistic in all settings. E.g., discretionary federal spending is not
required to be homogeneously spent across states, almost by denition of discretionality. Thus, Lockwood
(2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) have modelled scal federalism under the alternative hypothesis that
the central government can arbitrarily vary the provision of public goods across regions.
A straightforward extension of our theoretical framework includes both public goods whose centralized
provision is subject to a uniformity constraint, as in Section 2, and others that the central government can
instead provide in di¤erent amounts to di¤erent regions. Letting the former constitute the set U and the
latter the set D, the central government budget constraint becomes
bC = rCt +
X
p2U
xCl;p;t +
LX
l=1
X
p2D
xCl;p;t, (25)
while each region then receives public goods
gCl;p;t =
1
L
ep;txCp;t for p 2 U and gCl;p;t = ep;txCl;p;t for p 2 D. (26)
The model then features two opposite distributive patterns. As established by Proposition 4, uniformly
provided public goods (p 2 U) imply a benet of centralization for less informed regions. The empirical
evidence in Section 3 bears out this prediction, showing that national air quality standards adopted by the
EPA beneted disproportionately states with lower information Conversely, however, unconstrained discre-
tional spending tends to favor more politically inuential group. In our model, political inuence stems from
information, since more knowledgeable voters provide more of the politiciansincentives. As a consequence,
better informed regions benet disproportionately from non-uniform public goods (p 2 D), which are equally
nanced by all taxpayers. This pattern is consistent with evidence on the regional allocation of discretionary
government spending during the New Deal (Strömberg 2004). Responding to voters information, state
governors directed more public funds to counties with a greater share of radio listeners.
The balance between the two countervailing distributional forces depends on the relative importance of
the two types of public goods, which is summarized by the welfare weight of public goods that the central
17
government must provide uniformly:
U 
X
p2U
p 2 [0; 1] . (27)
Striking the appropriate balance emerges as a crucial requirement of centralization. Its absence is perilous:
the welfare gains described by Proposition 3 are no longer assured without it. Its presence is benecial:
by modulating the distribution of the accountability gains between informed and uninformed reason, it can
make centralization Pareto e¢ cient even in the absence of externalities, despite Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Suppose that preferences are homogeneous, information is heterogeneous, and there are no
externalities (lp = p and 
l
p = 0 for all l and p; l 6= m for some l 6= m).
1. There exists a threshold U 2
 
0; 1  C such that centralization yields higher aggregate welfare than
decentralization if and only if U  U .
2. There exists a threshold 2 > 0 such that centralization with an optimal uniformity constraint Pareto
dominates decentralization if U = 1  C and 2  2.
The rst result highlights that a uniformity constraint, which creates costs of centralization in the classic
theory of scal federalism (Oates 1972), is instead necessary for the e¢ ciency of centralization with het-
erogeneously informed voters. Centralization increases overall accountability and reduces aggregate rent
extraction. When public goods are uniformly provided by the central government, the resulting increase
in productive public spending benets the regions who need it most, because their local politicians extract
higher rents under decentralization. Indeed, uniformity induces an egalitarian inter-regional allocation, which
is precisely what aggregate welfare maximization requires. The uniformity constraint is not binding for a
benevolent central social planner when preferences are homogeneous
Instead, all public goods not subject to the uniformity constraint are provided preferentially to the most
informed regions. Their provision is exactly proportional to the level of information: Cl;p=
C
m;p = l=m for all
p 2 D. The resulting geographic misallocation of government expenditures can be more ine¢ cient than rent
extraction. The share of public goods whose centralized provision is not subject to the uniformity constraint
(1   U ) measures the share of the central budget that better informed regions can appropriate. In the
limit as U ! 0, uniformed voters certainly su¤er more under centralization, when their taxes are channeled
to public spending in better informed regions, than under decentralization, when they are defrauded by
rent-extracting local politicians. The welfare losses of redistribution across heterogeneously informed voters
loom larger than those of imperfect political agency. As evidence of such welfare costs, Ponzetto (2011) has
shown that knowledge asymmetries across voters can account for a Pareto ine¢ cient protectionist bias of
trade policy.
Proposition 5 highlights that the uniformity constraint can mediate between e¢ ciency and redistribution.
If it can be set optimally at the constitutional table, centralization may be made Pareto dominant. Better
incentives for ruling politicians create an aggregate surplus that can be shared across regions. For 1  U 
C , any region with more than average information (l > ) prefers the budget allocation induced by
centralization. Gaining control of centrally provided goods not subject to the uniformity constraint (1 U )
is worth more than a decrease in rent extraction to Dl < 
C . For C  1   U , any region with less
than average information (l < ) prefers the budget allocation induced by centralization. Reducing rent
extraction from Dl > 
C is worth more than the loss of control over distributive goods (1  U ). Hence, if
1  U = C centralization induces a Pareto dominant allocation of expenditures.
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Beyond the budget allocation, centralization inevitably improves the selection of politicians in less in-
formed regions, and worsens it in more informed ones. Centralization can be Pareto e¢ cient so long as
the resulting gains and losses are small, because politiciansability is not too variable (low 2). Then the
main problem in political agency is rent extraction (moral hazard) rather than the screening of more skilled
politician (adverse selection). In this case, centralization can always provide a Pareto e¢ cient improvement
in accountability.
5 Conclusions
Political accountability and the quality of government vary across regions within a country like the United
States, and across member states of international organizations like the European Union. In this paper, we
have shown that such regional di¤erences imply that centralization increases political accountability.
Our model emphasizes the role of di¤erences in votersinformation. Rent-seeking politicians have better
incentives when their constituents are more informed about the provision of public goods. We have shown
that electoral discipline has decreasing returns. Therefore, a central politician answerable to the whole
national electorate extracts lower rents than a collection of local politicians, some monitored tightly by well-
informed voters and some loosely by poorly-informed constituents. Hence, we have found that centralization
is benecial whenever voter information is heterogeneous across regions. This result can help to explain the
steady growth of the federal government over the history of the United States, and the sharp increase in the
scope and extent of the powers of the European Union since the 1970s (Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht
2005).
Our model also predicts distributional consequences of centralization when regions have di¤erent levels
of information, even without di¤erences in income. When the central government provides public goods
uniformly across the nation, the benets of centralization are monotone decreasing in voter information.
We have tested this prediction by analyzing the di¤erential impact across U.S. states of the Clean Air Act
of 1970. Beforehand, environmental regulation was largely in the hands of states and local governments.
Beginning in 1970, the federal government took charge and started introducing uniform national standards.
We have found signicant and robust evidence of di¤erences-in-di¤erences. Consistent with our theoretical
model, centralization of environmental policy induced a di¤erential decline in pollution in less informed
states, relative to better informed ones.
Our nding that centralization benets the least informed regions hinges on our focus on uniform policies,
both in our baseline model and in empirical evidence from pollutant emission standards. In our theoretical
framework, we have shown conversely that if the central politician can di¤erentiate local public good provision
across regions, he targets the most informed. While uniform policy entails a transfer of accountability from
the informed to the uninformed, discretionary spending reects a transfer of power from the uninformed to
the informed. Thus we have identied the balancing role of a uniformity requirement for central-government
policies. Some uniformity is necessary for centralization to be welfare increasing. A carefully calibrated
constraint can even ensure the Pareto e¢ ciency of centralization.
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A Derivations and Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The budget allocation and the expectation of the incumbents ability are derived in the body of the text.
The cumulative distribution function of ^p;t is
	t 
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jp"p;t. (A1)
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where F" (") is the cumulative distribution function of "p;t and f" (") its probability density function. SinceZ 1
 1
"F" (   ") f" (") d" = E ["F" (   ")] < E"E [F" (   ")] = 0, (A3)
an increase in 
PJ
j=1 jj
j
p induces an increase in ^p in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
A.2. Centralization and Decentralization
Under centralization, Proposition 1 implies that rent extraction is
C =

1 + 2~
 1
, (A4)
and the expected ability of a central politician is
E^Cp =
2
L
LX
l=1
lpl. (A5)
The relative shares of each local public good are
Cp =
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L
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. (A6)
Welfare in region l is
EuCl = log
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L
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 
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p

, (A7)
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and aggregate welfare is
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Under decentralization, Proposition 1 implies that rent extraction is
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and the expected ability of a local politician is
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and aggregate welfare is
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A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
A.3..1 Rent Extraction
Aggregate rent extraction is lower under centralization if and only if
C  1
L
LX
l=1
Dl , (A14)
which can be written
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f (x)  1
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(A16)
a strictly decreasing and strictly convex function of x > 0:
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Thus
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The rst inequality follows from convexity by Jensens inequality and holds strictly if l is heterogeneous
across regions. The second inequality follows from monotonicity and holds strictly if lp > 0 for some l and
p.
A.3..2 Ability
Average e¢ ciency in providing public good p is higher under centralization if and only if
E^Cp 
1
L
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E^Dl;p, (A19)
which can be written
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The right-hand side is weakly lower than the left-hand side, and strictly lower if lp > 0 for some l and p.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
A.4..1 The Decentralization Theorem
Suppose that information is homogeneous (l =  for all l). Then under centralization
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while under decentralization
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1. If there are no externalities and preferences are homogeneous (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2. If there are externalities and preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
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for some p), then under centralization
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Under decentralization
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Centralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while decentralization does
not unless p is homogeneous across goods.
Thus welfare is lower under decentralization due to increased rent extraction, lower government ef-
ciency, and also misallocation of expenditures across public goods unless p is homogeneous across
goods.
3. If there are no externalities and preferences are heterogeneous (lp = 0 for all l and p while 
l
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mp
for some l 6= m and p), then under centralization
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while under decentralization
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Decentralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while centralization does
not. Moreover, decentralization achieves a better screening of politicians
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because for each public good p
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unless lp = p for all l.
A.4..2 E¢ cient Centralization
Suppose that preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l). Then under centralization
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and
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Under decentralization
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1. The welfare cost of rent extraction falls with centralization:
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The rst inequality follows from convexity by Jensens inequality and holds strictly if l is heterogeneous
across regions. The second inequality follows from monotonicity and holds strictly if p > 0 for some
p.
2. Average ability increases under centralization for all public goods, as proved in Proposition 2:
3. Centralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while decentralization does
not unless p is homogeneous across public goods.
Thus centralization increases welfare whenever information is heterogeneous (l 6= m for some l 6= m)
or there are externalities in the provision of public goods (p > 0 for some p).
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A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l). Then public-good provision in
region l is
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The proof of Proposition 3 has established that @Dl;p=@l = 0 and @
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l =@l < 0. Recalling the proof of
Proposition 1, ^Dl;p is increasing in l in the sense of 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Similarly for residentswelfare
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If furthermore thee are no externalities (p = 0 for all p) then under decentralization
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If and only if l   then Dl  C , E^Dl;p  E^Cp , EuDl  EuCl , E exp
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with joint strict inequalities.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
The allocation under decentralization is una¤ected by aU < 1. Aggregate welfare is
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From Proposition 1, rent extraction under centralization is
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and the expected ability of a central politician is
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2p. (A56)
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The relative shares of each local public good are
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p for p 2 U and 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and aggregate welfare is
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Then aggregate welfare is greater under centralization if
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Region l gains from centralization if
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The function
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has a unique minimum
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and convexity
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Hence if
U =
2~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the left-hand side of condition A61 is a convex function of l 2 [0; 1] with minimum at l = . This also
proves that
U < 1  C . (A66)
Moreover, let
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Then for
2  1
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centralization Pareto dominates decentralization for U = C . Any region with l =  is always indi¤erent
between the two. Region m is also indi¤erent if 2 = 2, and strictly prefers centralization otherwise. Any
regions with l <  or l > m strictly prefer centralization.
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Table 1 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on SO2 Emissions
Dependent variable: SO2 Intensity of State GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper 1.322** -1.370 2.120*** 1.932 1.871*** 1.611
 after 1970 (0.554) (3.782) (0.740) (4.602) (0.632) (4.218)
Newspaper 0.448*** 3.853*** 0.400** 3.884*** 0.425*** 3.078***
 t since 1970 (0.117) (0.836) (0.156) (0.992) (0.134) (0.905)
State GDP -1.715** -0.141 -1.433* -0.138
 after 1970 (0.714) (0.099) (0.775) (0.103)
State GDP 0.104 -0.001 -0.014 -0.022
 t since 1970 (0.149) (0.020) (0.168) (0.021)
Manufacturing 1.354** 0.307**
 after 1970 (0.560) (0.155)
Manufacturing -0.235** 0.070**
 t since 1970 (0.111) (0.033)
Pop. density -1.561*** -0.002***
 after 1970 (0.532) (0.001)
Pop. density 0.465*** 0.001***
 t since 1970 (0.104) (0.000)
State xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Measures Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont.
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.968 0.967
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote signicance respectively at the 10%* , 5%** , and 1%***
condence level. Emissions are from the EPA; newspaper circulation per capita from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States ; state GDP, manufacturing value added and population density from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts. For all four
independent variables, binary measures in odd-numbered columns are dummies for a 1970 value above the mean across states;
continuous measures in even-numbered columns are 1970 values.
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Table 2 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on SO2 Emissions Groups
Dened by Time Averages
Dependent variable: SO2 Intensity of State GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper 0.492 -1.128 0.773 1.331 0.852** 1.234
 after 1970 (0.533) (3.962) (0.478) (4.690) (0.433) (4.255)
Newspaper 0.593*** 3.994*** 0.399*** 3.570*** 0.386*** 2.330***
 t since 1970 (0.111) (0.871) (0.098) (0.994) (0.091) (0.888)
State GDP -0.481 -0.103 -0.132 -0.101
 after 1970 (0.478) (0.092) (0.483) (0.096)
State GDP 0.334*** 0.018 0.285*** 0.009
 t since 1970 (0.098) (0.018) (0.100) (0.019)
Manufacturing 0.240 0.261*
 after 1970 (0.452) (0.140)
Manufacturing -0.027 0.069**
 t since 1970 (0.098) (0.030)
Pop. density -1.349*** -0.002***
 after 1970 (0.351) (0.001)
Pop. density 0.183*** 0.000***
 t since 1970 (0.069) (0.000)
State xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Measures Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont.
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.967 0.967 0.968 0.967 0.968 0.967
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote signicance respectively at the 10%* , 5%** , and 1%***
condence level. Emissions are from the EPA; newspaper circulation per capita from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States ; state GDP, manufacturing value added and population density from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts. For all four
independent variables, binary measures in odd-numbered columns are dummies for a 1963-1980 state average above the mean
of state averages; continuous measures in even-numbered columns are 1963-1980 state averages.
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Table 3 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on NOx Emissions
Dependent variable: NOX Intensity of State GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper -0.060 -2.524 -0.225 -5.114 -0.156 -4.153*
 after 1970 (0.218) (1.724) (0.345) (3.154) (0.300) (2.455)
Newspaper 0.177*** 1.872*** 0.188*** 2.602*** 0.163*** 2.183***
 t since 1970 (0.044) (0.360) (0.069) (0.635) (0.060) (0.492)
State GDP 0.354 0.110 0.602 0.135
 after 1970 (0.338) (0.077) (0.401) (0.086)
State GDP -0.024 -0.031** -0.067 -0.041**
 t since 1970 (0.068) (0.015) (0.081) (0.016)
Manufacturing -0.017 -0.074
 after 1970 (0.189) (0.083)
Manufacturing 0.060 0.067***
 t since 1970 (0.037) (0.016)
Pop. density -0.695*** -0.001**
 after 1970 (0.201) (0.000)
Pop. density 0.089** -0.000
 t since 1970 (0.039) (0.000)
State xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Measures Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont.
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.950 0.951 0.950 0.952 0.951 0.955
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote signicance respectively at the 10%* , 5%** , and 1%***
condence level. Emissions are from the EPA; newspaper circulation per capita from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States ; state GDP, manufacturing value added and population density from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts. For all four
independent variables, binary measures in odd-numbered columns are dummies for a 1970 value above the mean across states;
continuous measures in even-numbered columns are 1970 values.
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Table 4 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on NOx Emissions Groups
Dened by Time Averages
Dependent variable: NOX Intensity of State GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper -0.032 -2.408 -0.206 -5.284 -0.061 -4.032
 after 1970 (0.204) (1.754) (0.387) (3.252) (0.328) (2.521)
Newspaper 0.206*** 1.980*** 0.272*** 3.296*** 0.241*** 2.702***
 t since 1970 (0.041) (0.368) (0.078) (0.651) (0.066) (0.502)
State GDP 0.299 0.120 0.549 0.129
 after 1970 (0.387) (0.085) (0.451) (0.083)
State GDP -0.113 -0.055*** -0.162* -0.059***
 t since 1970 (0.078) (0.017) (0.091) (0.016)
Manufacturing -0.303 -0.057
 after 1970 (0.221) (0.068)
Manufacturing 0.075* 0.058***
 t since 1970 (0.044) (0.013)
Pop. density -0.522*** -0.001**
 after 1970 (0.175) (0.000)
Pop. density 0.088*** -0.000
 t since 1970 (0.034) (0.000)
State xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Measures Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont.
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.950 0.951 0.951 0.955 0.951 0.957
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote signicance respectively at the 10%* , 5%** , and 1%***
condence level. Emissions are from the EPA; newspaper circulation per capita from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States ; state GDP, manufacturing value added and population density from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts. For all four
independent variables, binary measures in odd-numbered columns are dummies for a 1963-1980 state average above the mean
of state averages; continuous measures in even-numbered columns are 1963-1980 state averages.
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Figure 1 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on SO2 Emissions
Sources: Emissions are from the EPA, newspaper circulation from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, and GDP from
the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 2 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on SO2 Emissions Groups
Dened by Time Averages
Sources: Emissions are from the EPA, newspaper circulation from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, and GDP from
the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 3 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on NOx Emissions
Sources: Emissions are from the EPA, newspaper circulation from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, and GDP from
the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 4 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on NOx Emissions Groups
Dened by Time Averages
Sources: Emissions are from the EPA, newspaper circulation from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, and GDP from
the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 5 Information and State GDP per Capita
Sources: Newspaper circulation is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and GDP from the BEA Regional Economic
Accounts.
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Figure 6 Information and the Share of Manufacturing in State GDP
Sources: Newspaper circulation is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, GDP and value added in manufacturing
from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
40
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2010 
 
2010/1, De Borger, B., Pauwels, W.: "A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls and 
investment in serial transport corridors" 
2010/2, Chirinko, R.; Wilson, D.: "Can Lower Tax Rates Be Bought? Business Rent-Seeking And Tax Competition 
Among U.S. States" 
2010/3, Esteller-Moré, A.; Rizzo, L.: "Politics or mobility? Evidence from us excise taxation" 
2010/4, Roehrs, S.; Stadelmann, D.: "Mobility and local income redistribution" 
2010/5, Fernández Llera, R.; García Valiñas, M.A.: "Efficiency and elusion: both sides of public enterprises in Spain" 
2010/6, González Alegre, J.: "Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental grants: the European regional policy and 
Spanish autonomous regions" 
2010/7, Jametti, M.; Joanis, M.: "Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects" 
2010/8, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Should tax bases overlap in a federation with lobbying?" 
2010/9, Cubel, M.: "Fiscal equalization and political conflict" 
2010/10, Di Paolo, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Calero, J.: "Exploring educational mobility in Europe" 
2010/11, Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J.: "Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability" 
2010/12, Arqué Castells, P.: "Venture capital and innovation at the firm level" 
2010/13, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Polo-Otero, J.: "Which firms want PhDS? The effect of the university-
industry relationship on the PhD labour market" 
2010/14, Calabrese, S.; Epple, D.: "On the political economy of tax limits" 
2010/15, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "Is agglomeration taxable?" 
2010/16, Dragu, T.; Rodden, J.: "Representation and regional redistribution in federations" 
2010/17, Borck, R; Wimbersky, M.: "Political economics of higher education finance" 
2010/18, Dohse, D; Walter, S.G.: "The role of entrepreneurship education and regional context in forming 
entrepreneurial intentions" 
2010/19, Åslund, O.; Edin, P-A.; Fredriksson, P.; Grönqvist, H.: "Peers, neighborhoods and immigrant student 
achievement - Evidence from a placement policy" 
2010/20, Pelegrín, A.; Bolance, C.: "International industry migration and firm characteristics: some evidence from the 
analysis of firm data" 
2010/21, Koh, H.; Riedel, N.: "Do governments tax agglomeration rents?" 
2010/22, Curto-Grau, M.; Herranz-Loncán, A.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "The political economy of infraestructure construction: 
The Spanish “Parliamentary Roads” (1880-1914)" 
2010/23, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Mora, T.: "Citizens’ control and the efficiency of local public services" 
2010/24, Ahamdanech-Zarco, I.; García-Pérez, C.; Simón, H.: "Wage inequality in Spain: A regional perspective" 
2010/25, Folke, O.: “Shades of brown and green: Party effects in proportional election systems” 
2010/26, Falck, O.; Heblich, H.; Lameli, A.; Südekum, J.: “Dialects, cultural identity and economic exchange” 
2010/27, Baum-Snow, N.; Pavan, R.: “Understanding the city size wage gap” 
2010/28, Molloy, R.; Shan, H.: “The effect of gasoline prices on household location” 
2010/29, Koethenbuerger, M.: “How do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism? Tax vs. 
expenditure optimization” 
2010/30, Abel, J.; Dey, I.; Gabe, T.: “Productivity and the density of human capital” 
2010/31, Gerritse, M.: “Policy competition and agglomeration:  a local government view” 
2010/32, Hilber, C.; Lyytikäinen, T.; Vermeulen, W.: “Capitalization of central government grants into local house 
prices: panel data evidence from England” 
2010/33, Hilber, C.; Robert-Nicoud, F.: “On the origins of land use regulations: theory and evidence from us metro 
areas” 
2010/34, Picard, P.; Tabuchi, T.: “City with forward and backward linkages” 
2010/35, Bodenhorn, H.; Cuberes, D.: “Financial development and city growth: evidence from Northeastern American 
cities, 1790-1870” 
2010/36, Vulovic, V.: “The effect of sub-national borrowing control on fiscal sustainability: how to regulate?” 
2010/37, Flamand, S.: “Interregional transfers, group loyalty and the decentralization of redistribution” 
2010/38, Ahlfeldt, G.; Feddersen, A.: “From periphery to core: economic adjustments to high speed rail” 
2010/39, González-Val, R.; Pueyo, F.: “First nature vs. second nature causes: industry location and growth in the 
presence of an open-access renewable resource” 
2010/40, Billings, S.; Johnson, E.: “A nonparametric test for industrial specialization” 
2010/41, Lee, S.; Li, Q.: “Uneven landscapes and the city size distribution” 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2010/42, Ploeckl. F.: “Borders, market access and urban growth; the case of Saxon towns and the Zollverein” 
2010/43, Hortas-Rico, M.: “Urban sprawl and municipal budgets in Spain: a dynamic panel data analysis” 
2010/44, Koethenbuerger, M.: “Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany” 
2010/45, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence 
from Spain” 
2010/46, Larcinese, V.; Rizzo; L.; Testa, C.: “Why do small states receive more federal money? Us senate 
representation and the allocation of federal budget” 
2010/47, Patacchini, E.; Zenou, Y.: “Neighborhood effects and parental involvement in the intergenerational 
transmission of education” 
2010/48, Nedelkoska, L.: “Occupations at risk: explicit task content and job security” 
2010/49, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “The mechanisms of agglomeration: Evidence 
from the effect of inter-industry relations on the location of new firms” 
2010/50, Revelli, F.: “Tax mix corners and other kinks” 
2010/51, Duch-Brown, N.; Parellada-Sabata M.; Polo-Otero, J.: “Economies of scale and scope of university research 
and technology transfer: a flexible multi-product approach” 
2010/52, Duch-Brown, N.; Vilalta M.: “Can better governance increase university efficiency?” 
2010/53, Cremer, H.; Goulão, C.: “Migration and social insurance” 
2010/54, Mittermaier, F; Rincke, J.: “Do countries compensate firms for international wage differentials?” 
2010/55, Bogliacino, F; Vivarelli, M.: “The job creation effect or R&D expenditures” 
2010/56, Piacenza, M; Turati, G.: “Does fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments affect citizens’ well-being? 
Evidence on health” 
 
 
2011 
 
2011/1, Oppedisano, V; Turati, G.: "What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time in 
Europe? Evidence from PISA" 
2011/2, Dahlberg, M; Edmark, K; Lundqvist, H.: "Ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution " 
2011/3, Canova, L.; Vaglio, A.: "Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help” 
2011/4, Delgado, F.J.; Lago-Peñas, S.; Mayor, M.: “On the determinants of local tax rates: new evidence from Spain” 
2011/5, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: “A model of music piracy with popularity-dependent copying costs” 
2011/6, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.; Parellada, M.: “Universities and regional economic growth in Spanish regions” 
2011/7, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.: “Do universities affect firms’ location decisions? Evidence from Spain” 
2011/8, Dahlberg, M.; Mörk, E.: “Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from election 
year effects” 
2011/9, Costas-Pérez, E.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Corruption scandals, press reporting, and 
accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors” 
2011/10, Choi, A.; Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: “Hell to touch the sky? private tutoring and academic achievement in 
Korea” 
2011/11, Mira Godinho, M.; Cartaxo, R.: “University patenting, licensing and technology transfer: how organizational 
context and available resources determine performance” 
2011/12, Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.; Montolio, D.: “The link between public support and private R&D 
effort: What is the optimal subsidy?” 
2011/13, Breuillé, M.L.; Duran-Vigneron, P.; Samson, A.L.: “To assemble to resemble? A study of tax disparities 
among French municipalities” 
2011/14, McCann, P.; Ortega-Argilés, R.: “Smart specialisation, regional growth and applications to EU cohesion 
policy” 
2011/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.: “Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications” 
2011/16, Pelegrín, A.; Bolancé, C.: “Offshoring and company characteristics: some evidence from the analysis of 
Spanish firm data” 
2011/17, Lin, C.: “Give me your wired and your highly skilled: measuring the impact of immigration policy on 
employers and shareholders”  
2011/18, Bianchini, L.; Revelli, F.: “Green polities: urban environmental performance and government popularity” 
2011/19, López Real, J.: “Family reunification or point-based immigration system? The case of the U.S. and Mexico” 
2011/20, Bogliacino, F.; Piva, M.; Vivarelli, M.: “The impact of R&D on employment in Europe: a firm-level analysis” 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011/21, Tonello, M.: “Mechanisms of peer interactions between native and non-native students: rejection or 
integration?” 
2011/22, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Montolio, D.: “What type of innovative firms acquire knowledge 
intensive services and from which suppliers?” 
2011/23, Banal-Estañol, A.; Macho-Stadler, I.; Pérez-Castrillo, D.: “Research output from university-industry 
collaborative projects” 
2011/24, Ligthart, J.E.; Van Oudheusden, P.: “In government we trust: the role of fiscal decentralization” 
2011/25, Mongrain, S.; Wilson, J.D.: “Tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility” 
2011/26, Caruso, R.; Costa, J.; Ricciuti, R.: “The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007” 
2011/27, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Local spending and the housing boom” 
2011/28, Simón, H.; Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.: “Occupational mobility of immigrants in a low skilled economy. The 
Spanish case” 
2011/29, Piolatto, A.; Trotin, G.: “Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory” 
2011/30, Montolio, D; Piolatto, A.: “Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns” 
2011/31, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Vivarelli, M.: “The determinants of YICs’ R&D activity” 
2011/32, Goodspeed, T.J.: “Corruption, accountability, and decentralization: theory and evidence from Mexico” 
2011/33, Pedraja, F.; Cordero, J.M.: “Analysis of alternative proposals to reform the Spanish intergovernmental 
transfer system for municipalities” 
2011/34, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Welfare spending and ethnic heterogeneity: 
evidence from a massive immigration wave” 
2011/35, Lyytikäinen, T.: “Tax competition among local governments: evidence from a property tax reform in Finland” 
2011/36, Brülhart, M.; Schmidheiny, K.: “Estimating the Rivalness of State-Level Inward FDI” 
2011/37, García-Pérez, J.I.; Hidalgo-Hidalgo, M.; Robles-Zurita, J.A.: “Does grade retention affect achievement? 
Some evidence from Pisa” 
2011/38, Boffa, f.; Panzar. J.: “Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative” 
2011/39, González-Val, R.; Olmo, J.: “Growth in a cross-section of cities: location, increasing returns or random 
growth?” 
2011/40, Anesi, V.; De Donder, P.: “Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression” 
2011/41, Di Pietro, G.; Mora, T.: “The effect of the l’Aquila earthquake on labour market outcomes” 
2011/42, Brueckner, J.K.; Neumark, D.: “Beaches, sunshine, and public-sector pay: theory and evidence on amenities 
and rent extraction by government workers” 
2011/43, Cortés, D.: “Decentralization of government and contracting with the private sector” 
2011/44, Turati, G.; Montolio, D.; Piacenza, M.: “Fiscal decentralisation, private school funding, and students’ 
achievements. A tale from two Roman catholic countries” 
 
 
2012 
 
2012/1, Montolio, D.; Trujillo, E.: "What drives investment in telecommunications? The role of regulation, firms’ 
internationalization and market knowledge" 
2012/2, Giesen, K.; Suedekum, J.: "The size distribution across all “cities”: a unifying approach" 
2012/3, Foremny, D.; Riedel, N.: "Business taxes and the electoral cycle" 
2012/4, García-Estévez, J.; Duch-Brown, N.: "Student graduation: to what extent does university expenditure matter?" 
2012/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax 
enforcement" 
2012/6, Pickering, A.C.; Rockey, J.: "Ideology and the growth of US state government" 
2012/7, Vergolini, L.; Zanini, N.: "How does aid matter? The effect of financial aid on university enrolment decisions" 
2012/8, Backus, P.: "Gibrat’s law and legacy for non-profit organisations: a non-parametric analysis" 
2012/9, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "What underlies localization and urbanization 
economies? Evidence from the location of new firms" 
2012/10, Mantovani, A.; Vandekerckhove, J.: "The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in 
complementary markets" 
2012/11, Garcia-López, M.A.: "Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation in Barcelona" 
2012/12, Revelli, F.: "Business taxation and economic performance in hierarchical government structures" 
2012/13, Arqué-Castells, P.; Mohnen, P.: "Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement effects" 
 
Fiscal Federalism 
